Miscalculated Saudi Policy: Peace is Much Cheaper Than War

Miscalculated Saudi Policy
Peace is Much Cheaper Than War

By Hassan Al-Haifi

The last war that Saudi Arabia engaged in independently was the Yemeni – Saudi War of 1934 and it might be worth recalling that it was the King of Yemen then, who appealed to the wisdom of King Abdul-Aziz to end the war on a temporary truce, lest the foreign forces that were prying for power and influence in the region close all the channels for fraternal Arab brothers to make peace. Incidentally in that war, Prince Ahmed Bin Yahya, the Imam’s son and commander of the Yemeni forces had advanced beyond Najran and was already on his way towards cutting the supply lines of Prince Faisal (later King of Saudi Arabia), who had already advanced to near Hodeida. The war would have been a disaster for the Saudis then, because Ahmed was a military genius beyond dispute, as many of his companions have quickly attested. Thus, when Imam Yahya rightly or wrongly called for a truce, it was out of conviction that Arabs should not be fighting Arabs, especially if both were Moslems and surely should not fight wars for the sake of foreign powers. Many of those accompanying Prince Ahmed would be quick to point out that this moment was the first time they saw Prince Ahmed cry, when his father ordered him to retreat back to the agreed truce lines. Ahmed is well known for never having to lose any battles or wars he was engaged in and was unequalled in military genius in his times. He knew well how to handle and lead Yemeni tribesmen and make a formidable force out of them, even if they were meagerly equipped. He was so confident that the Saudis were easy game then and was ready to march to Taef City after cutting the lines of supply to Faisal. King Abdul- Aziz knew this well and saw good wisdom in agreeing to the truce suggested by Imam Yahya. Whatever the case, any war between the brotherly nations of Yemen and Saudi Arabia is never good for any of the adversaries involved. Thus, it was with surprise and total disagreement that this observer finds it nec3essary to suggest to our Saudi brothers that if the Egyptians with a force of 70,000 troops could not break the back of the resistance they met in Sa’ada during the war to save the Republic (1962 – 1969), how can they expect to do better, when the force they are confronting is far more resolute and apparently well adapted to durable combat. The Saudis are also causing much more anger to reside within the hearts and minds of many Yemenis, who really expected that their Saudi brothers would look with greater affinity towards their southern brothers and invest in the development of the country, so that Yemenis will be less contemptuous (not jealous, mind you) of their Saudi brothers for enjoying the lavish splendor they are living under, while turning the other way when they realize how destitute are the lives of their southern brothers. One surely does not think that the counsel that the Saudis are getting to carry out a meaningless and surely fruitless war against any Yemeni faction is actually counterproductive and not in the interests of the Saudi family at all. Never mind that the Saudis will only enflame the anger of Yemenis, who are already saddened by the ungrateful attitude of the Saudis towards the Yemenis, who played a major role in the building of modern Saudi Arabia during the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The recent fighting in the Yemeni – Saudi border, even if it has the blessings of the Saleh regime, is absolutely contrary to the interests of both the Yemeni and Saudi people, and surely counterproductive, as far as the Saudi regime is concerned. The Saudis are not only arousing the anger of the majority of Yemeni citizens, but causing great disfavor among most of the Arab people, who will tend to view the battle north of Sa’ada as a David – versus Goliath encounter. With the Houthis regarded as the David in this battle and with the Saudis not looked upon very favorably already in most of the Arab streets, for many reasons, which one would not like to delve in now, the observer believes that it is time to let wisdom prevail in determining the course of Saudi policy towards their brothers in the South. Fired up emotions and misguided arithmetic are not the ways to handle relations with neighbors, who have been tested many times in battle and the support of the regime in Sana’a to Saudi intervention may have its own undesirable outcomes from the Saudi viewpoint as time will soon show.
On the other hand, instead of wasting countless billions of Riyals in a seemingly unwinnable war, the Saudis could consider investing a quarter of the money to be wasted on the development of their southern neighbor, who God has left under the hands of a government that has for all practical purposes missed out on the performance of the Social Contract to which they have been committed to for well over a quarter of a century. One important question remains to be answered: Should the regime in Sana’a compromise the sovereignty of Yemen because it could not overcome what began as a minor security issue and eventually turned into a full scale rebellion, because of the way the regime confronted the Houthis at the start of the conflict up to these trying moments?

Yemen Times Issue 1310
November 9, 2009