Al-Houthis and Al-Qaida in Yemen: What, When and Why
Saudi unexploded bombs
dropped in Sa'ada
Victims of Sa'ada War
Alleged "underwear"
explosive powder
?
What is Next?
By: Hassan Al-Haifi
The first five rounds of the Sa'ada conflict were fought mainly between the Yemeni Government forces and the Believing Youth Movement founded by the late Hussein Badr Eddine Al-Houthi (killed in the First Round in September 2004). That was the only successful round for the Yemeni Government. Hussein Al-Houthi was the son of a very prominent Zeidi scholar (now in his nineties) and a scholar in his own right. The Yemeni Government, under prodding from Salafi and Wahhabi followers projected Hussein Al-Houthi and his followers as Shiites of the 12th Imam or Ja'afari persuasion, i.e., followers of Iran. There is quite a difference between the Zeidi sect and these other 2 Shia sects. The Zeidis may be viewed as predominantly Sunni in doctrine, except for the political view that the caliphate was to remain within the descendants of the House of Ali and the Prophet's daughter Fatima. The Government of Yemen accuses the Houthis; alias Believing Youth (No relations to the Somali group at all) of wanting to reinstate the Imamate. In an Abu Dhabi Satellite Channel interview Hussein Al-Houthi tried to show otherwise: "If I wanted a leadership position, I would seek the Presidency. The only requirement is the ability to read and write. There are 14 tough conditions in order to be an Imam, which most likely I could never fulfill". The Houthis insist that they are only preventing the systematic marginalization and elimination of the Zeidi sect, which many government officials of Salafi persuasion or Saudi linkage have vied to achieve. The former Governor of Sa'ada Yahya Al-Amry (now ironically the Governor of Dhamar, which is another former Zeidi stronghold) was doing all in his power to facilitate the political and spiritual empowerment of the Salafi/Wahhabi organizations. He also tightened restrictions on any cultural, educational and religious activities by Zeidi followers. The Governor tried to arrest Hussein Al-Houthi (an MP) on the premise that the latter was organizing marches in support of the Palestinians, who were then undergoing the worst treatment that Israeli right wing Prime Minister Ariel Sharon could inflict on the Palestinians in the "Second Intifada". Al-Houthi and some of his followers were stopped at a security checkpoint. Al-Houthi sensed that Al-Amry was trying to find any excuse to have him killed. Failing to negotiate his way out of the ambush, he shot his way to escape and Round One began (18 June 2004 - 15 September 2004).
Many observers warned then not to engage in any conflict with the proud and resilient people of Sa'ada. Historically, Sa'ada Governorate has never been forcefully subdued. In the Civil War of 1962 – 1970, Sa'ada and the nearby governorates withheld a modern Egyptian Army that reached 70,000 strong. Ironically at that time, Saudi Arabia was supporting the Zeidi backers of the Imam then, out of fear of the spread of Nasserite Nationalism. President Nasser of Egypt was calling for the overthrow of most traditional monarchies in the Arab World.
The Houthis managed to rebound after every round. The Government was compelled to make temporary truces with the Houthis after each Round. The Fourth Round peace agreement mediated by Qatar actually even called for the exile of all the Houthi family members and leaders. However, the Yemeni Government reneged on some of its obligations (releasing Houthi or suspected Houthi detainees), while continuing the tough campaign against the Zeidis in general.
The Sa'ada War became a profitable enterprise for many players in Yemen, who managed to commit both the Yemeni Government and the Saudi Government (the latter footing the bill for the most part, and probably not too pleased at the growing influential role of Qatar) to insist on the complete defeat of the Houthis. The Houthis grew stronger and more experienced. By the time the Sixth Round flared up last Ramadhan or September 2009, the Houthis had become (at least in their own turf in Sa'ada and Amran Governorates) well in command of the situation. Out of frustration at the Government forces not being able to make headway with the Houthis, the Saudis first provided logistical support to the Government forces: use of Saudi territory for movement or tactical maneuvering and use of facilities. The Houthis found this irritating and finally were forced into a showdown with the Saudis over borderline Mount Dukhan, which was mostly in Saudi territory. Probably the Saudis wish now that they stayed out of the fighting. Observers suggest that Saudi continuing involvement would present insurmountable security risks for the Saudi regime. Long engagements by the Saudis threaten the domestic security situation in the Kingdom, as well as bring embarrassment for the Saudis regionally and internationally. But the Saudis are now stuck with having achieved very little to bolster the Yemeni Government efforts or to regain their lost territory. With the Houthis projecting a David versus Goliath scenario, and the credibility of the Saudis and the Yemeni Government declining, the Al-Qaida factor mow comes to the rescue to bring in a third player: Uncle Sam.
Yemen Times 1330
18 January 2010
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